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QUANTITATIVE DEDUCTION 
AND ITS FIXPOINT THEORY 
M. H. VAN EMDEN 
D Logic programming provides a model for rule-based reasoning in expert 
systems. The advantage of this formal model is that it makes available many 
results from the semantics and proof theory of first-order predicate logic. A 
disadvantage is that in expert systems one often wants to use, instead of the 
usual two truth values, an entire continuum of “uncertainties” in between. 
That is, instead of the usual “qualitative” deduction, a form of “quantita- 
tive” deduction is required. We present an approach to generalizing the 
Tarskian semantics of Horn clause rules to justify a form of quantitative 
deduction. Each clause receives a numerical attenuation factor. Herbrand 
interpretations, which are subsets of the Herbrand base, are generalized to 
subsets which are fuzzy in the sense of Zadeh. We show that as result the 
fixpoint method in the semantics of Horn clause rules can be developed in 
much the same way for the quantitative case. As for proof theory, the 
interesting phenomenon is that a proof should be viewed as a two-person 
game. The value of the game turns out to be the truth value of the atomic 
formula to be proved, evaluated in the minimal fixpoint of the rule set. The 
analog of the PROLOG interpreter for quantitative deduction becomes a 
search of the game tree (= proof tree) using the alpha-beta heuristic well 
known in game theory. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Developers of expert systems have found the usual logical reasoning in terms of the 
truth values true and false insufficient for their purpose. They have implemented 
several quantitative alternatives, where these truth values are replaced by probabili- 
ties or other measures of uncertainty. Of the different alternatives none has been 
sufficiently convincing to replace the others, nor has it become clear which method is 
preferable in a given situation. 
This state of affairs is perhaps unavoidable, at least temporarily. It is a conse- 
quence of working backward from the application. We should complement this 
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approach with another one working forward from a well-established, coherent 
method of world description and reasoning to obtain a quantitative alternative to 
existing methods. A difference with working backward from the application is that 
coherence, rather than applicability, has priority. We should make it clear right from 
the start that we know of no application of quantitative deduction. We investigate a 
mathematically compelling, easily implementable generalization of a practically 
important system (namely the pure-PROLOG subset of logic programming) in the 
expectation that an application will turn up, sooner or later. 
We have chosen the Horn clause subset of first-order predicate logic as a 
well-established, coherent method of world description and reasoning. It is well 
established by having a semantics in the sense of Tarski. It is coherent by the 
existence of correctness and completeness results for its proof procedures. The latter 
include proof procedures that are understandable by humans in terms of problem 
reduction and that are computer-implementable with sufficient speed. Sets of Horn 
clauses used in this way are also known as “logic programs” and are written in the 
pure subset of the PROLOG language. In this paper we will interchangeably use 
“rule sets” and “logic programs” for sets of positive Horn clauses, both in their 
qualitative and quantitative forms. 
Having chosen our starting point, in what way will we now choose our extension? 
We regard the truth value false as the real number 0, true as the real number 1. We 
extend the concept of truth value to include all real numbers in between. There are 
two concepts in Horn clause logic that we generalize from the qualitative to the 
quantitative. The first is the implication in a rule, consisting of a condition and a 
conclusion. The implication can be regarded as transferring truth from the condition 
to the conclusion. We associate with each implication an attenuation factor f, which 
can be thought of as contributing f X t to the truth value of the conclusion if t is the 
truth value of the condition. Of course, the precise definition of the meaning of rules 
is determined by the mathematical definition, to be given later on, of when a rule is 
true in a given interpretation. 
The second concept to be generalized is that of the interpretation, an abstract 
kind of possible world, in which a given rule set is true or false, according to a 
precise definition. These interpretations are usually thought of as relational struc- 
tures, specifying which individuals stand in which relation. Each relation by itself is 
readily thought of as equivalent o a set of tuples of individuals: namely the set of 
exactly those tuples among which the relation holds. It is perhaps less familiar to 
think of several relations among individuals as a set, but this has important 
advantages. A set I of variable-free atomic formulas can be used to specify a 
relational structure, and hence an interpretation. For example, we can consider, for a 
given P, the set R of all tuples (tl, . . . , t,) such that the formula P(tl, . . . , t,) is in I. 
Then R is one of the relations of I, when I is regarded as a relational structure. 
Now, in the usual relational structure, two individuals either stand in a given 
relation, or they do not. It may be useful to allow other alternatives. We obtain 
quantitative interpretations by regarding them as fuzzy subsets (in the sense of 
Zadeh [lo]) of the set of all variable-free atomic formulas. A result is that a 
relational structure can specify that a relation between individuals holds with a 
certain strength, characterized by any natural number between 0 and 1. Strength 0 
(1) then can be taken to correspond to the absence (presence) of the relation in the 
conventional sense. 
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Because quantitative interpretations can be operated on in much the same way as 
the usual ones, we can transfer the existing results on the semantics of logic 
programs into close analogs which hold for the quantitative version of the theory. In 
particular, the powerful method of fixpoints is used in a similar fashion. Sometimes 
not only the theorems, but also the proofs can be adopted unchanged. At other times 
interesting differences emerge, such as in the approximation theorem for least 
fixpoints. 
In proof theory we also find strong similarities and some interesting differences. 
In the first place, we have to make it clear what it means to generalize proofs to the 
quantitative case. We consider the simple situation where the question, of which the 
answer is to be proved, is a single variable-free atomic formula A. It is supplied with 
a truth value t between 0 and 1, and we expect a proof to prove that A has 
membership value at least equal to f in the minimal model of the rule set. As before, 
the qualitative case is a special case: there the supplied truth value is implicitly 1; 
from the proof we conclude that A belongs (in the nonfuzzy sense) to the minimal 
model. 
Proofs using the usual Horn clauses are found by searching the and/or tree 
associated with the set of clauses. The PROLOG interpreter performs this search 
depth first, from left to right. It is well known that and/or trees can be regarded as 
game trees for a suitably chosen game. This game is determined, of course, by the 
rules generating the and/or tree. The values 0 and 1 correspond to false and true in 
the and/or tree. In the game tree they correspond to loss and win for one of the 
players, say, White. Usually, however, game trees are too large to be evaluated to the 
end of the game. As a result heuristic game values have to be used: these are real 
numbers that can be normalized to lie between 0 and 1, given a degree of 
expectation that White can win from the associated position. There is a well-known 
algorithm for searching game trees with heuristic game values; it is called alpha-beta. 
When we translate back from game trees with heuristic game values, we obtain 
and/or trees with fuzzy truth values. This suggests that a version of alpha-beta 
search is suitable for answering questions to quantitative rule sets. A quick check will 
show that in the special case of rules with all factors equal to 1, the alpha-beta search 
gives the same behavior as a PROLOG interpreter. 
Now some remarks on related work. In a sense, [3] is most closely related: all 
results in it find their quantitative counterparts in the present work. In another 
sense, Shapiro’s [8] is most closely related, as it is the only existing paper giving a 
quantitative treatment of the semantics and proof theory of logic programs. Shapiro 
gives a general method for computing uncertainties,‘of which ours [Definition 2.1’(c)] 
is a special case. Our decision to forgo Shapiro’s level of generality is richly rewarded 
in terms of results. In fact, Shapiro’s only semantical result is his quantitative version 
of the fact that the intersection of Herbrand models is a model, for Horn clauses. Of 
course, this result in [8] is proved for a whole class of quantitative schemes; ours 
only for one. 
Finally, a word about the organization of this paper. In this investigation we have 
been guided by a close analogy between the qualitative and the quantitative case of 
rule-based reasoning. To make this analogy as clear as possible, we often first remind 
the reader of existing definitions or results in the qualitative case and then present 
the quantitative analogy. In such situations we use a numbering scheme to reflect the 
analogy: if the qualitative item is numbered n.m, then the corresponding quantita- 
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tive item is numbered n.m’. Independently of this parallel presentation, numbers 
with a prime reference quantitative items. 
2. SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF FINITE SETS OF RULES 
Syntax is quickly disposed of. Qualitative rules have a conclusion and a condition. 
We will write such a rule in the style 
A + B,& -. . &B,,, n 2 0. 
A quantitative rule also has a conclusion and a condition (with the same syntax as in 
the qualitative case). In addition it has a factor, a real number f in the interval (0, 11. 
This component is called thus because it will appear from the meaning of a rule, 
defined later on, that the rule contributes to the conclusion a truth value which is f 
times the truth value of the condition. We write the rule as 
A -0 -B,& . . . &B,,, n 20. 
The intention is to show the factor f “embedded” in the arrow. 
Having disposed of syntax, we now turn our attention to semantics. In both the 
qualitative and the quantitative case, the Herbrand base B, of a set P of rules is 
defined as the set of all variable-free atomic formulas that can be formed with the 
symbols contained in P. 
In the qualitative case, a Herbrand interpretation is defined as a mapping 
B, --, {false,true}, where the range is the set of truth values. A Herbrand interpreta- 
tion is often regarded as a subset of B,, namely of those atomic formulas mapping 
to true. In the quantitative case the range is the interval [0, l] of real numbers. Here a 
Herbrand interpretation can still be regarded as a subset of B,, provided we 
consider the subset to be “fuzzy” in the sense of Zadeh [lo]. By identifying 1 with 
true and 0 with false, we make qualitative interpretations a special case of quantita- 
tive ones. The mapping B, --, [0, l] can be thought of as the membership function 
characterizing a “fuzzy” subset I of B,. 
All Herbrand interpretations, qualitative or quantitative, of a given set P of rules 
can be specified by a function val taking as arguments a variable-free atomic 
formula A, and an interpretation I and having as result val( A, I), the value of the 
membership function for I at the argument A. 
Now that we know that a Herbrand interpretation is, the first thing to straighten 
out is when a rule set is true in a given interpretation I. For the qualitative case we 
recall [3] the following 
Dejinition 2.1. 
(a) A rule set is true in Z iff every one of its rules is true in I. 
(b) A rule is true in Z iff every one of its variable-free instances is true in I. 
(c) A variable-free instance A + B, & . . . &B,, is true in I iff A is true in Z or at 
least one of B,, . . . , B, is false in I. (This last “or” is the usual nonexclusive 
one.) 
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For the quantitative case we have the 
Definition 2. I ‘. 
(a) A rule set is true in I iff every one of its rules is true in I. 
(b) A rule is true in I iff every one of its variable-free instances is true in I. 
(c) A variable-free instance A + 0 -B, & . - . &B,, of a rule is true in I iff 
val(A,Z)2fXmin{val(B,,I)/iE {l,...,n}}. 
(We define min 0 = 1.) 
It will be seen that parts (a) and (b) are the same as in the qualitative case. Note 
that for rules with f- 1 and I such that val(A, I) = 0 or val(A, I) = 1 for all A, c) is 
also the same as in the qualitative case. 
Definition 2.2, 2.2’. A Herbrand interpretation I such that a rule set P is true in I, 
is called a Herbrand model of P. 
In this paper we use the turnstile symbol (usually meaning logical implication) in 
a different way. 
Definition 2.3. For all rule sets P and all A E B,, P k {A + } iff the right-hand side 
is true in every Herbrand model of P. 
Let us now consider the quantitative version: 
DeJnition 2.3’. For all rule sets P, all A E B,, and all f E [0, 11, P I= {A + 0 -} 
iff the right-hand side is true in every Herbrand model of P. 
In the quantitative case we have that 
P I= ( A -0 -) implies P I= (A +a -) for any f’ s f. 
Thus we should be careful to make as strong as possible a statement by making the f 
as large as possible. In the quantitative case one cannot fail to do so: it corresponds 
tof=1. 
Let us denote by M(P) the set of Herbrand models of a rule set P. flM( P) is 
also defined in the quantitative case if we adopt Zadeh’s rule [lo] for intersections: 
val(A,flS’)=inf{val(A,S):SES’}, 
where S’ is a family of Herbrand interpretations and inf is the greatest lower bound. 
In the qualitative case we found [3] as characterization of the intersection of all 
Herbrand models: 
fhl4(P)={A:AEB&Pk{A+}}. (2.4) 
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Its quantitative analog is given in the following: 
Theorem 2.4’. 
val(A,flM(P))=sup(x(P~ {A+@-}), 
where sup is the least upper bound. 
PROOF. If P is a rule set, I a model of P, A E B,, and P k {A t @ -}, then 
{A 6 @ -} is true in I and, by (2.1’), val( A, I) 2 x. Therefore, 
val(A,Z)>sup(x~P~ {A+@-}) 
for any model I E M(P), and 
val(A,nM(P))zs~p{~lPI=A+@-}. 
Strict inequality in the above relation is impossible, as we have P I= A + @ -, 
where u = val(A,flM(P)), for all P and all A E B,. q 
A consequence of our definition is that the value of A in the minimal model of 
(A+@-B&C, ~+a-,c+-@-} 
depends only on the minimum of q and r. Quantitative deduction is not applicable 
in situations where, for example, A should have a higher value for q = 0.5 and r = 1 
than for q = 0.5 and r = 0.5. 
The method followed in [l, 3,5] is to associate with each rule set P a mapping Tp 
from interpretations to interpretations and to show that fixpoints of Tp are models 
of P. Then various mathematical results about Tp can be used to discover properties 
of models. 
Here we follow the same method. First a reminder of the definition in the 
qualitative case: 
Dejinition 2.5. 
T,,(I) = { AIA + B,& . -a &B, is a variable-free 
instance of a rule in P and B, E I,. . . , B, E I } . 
For the quantitative case we use: 
DeJinition 2.5’. For every A E B, 
val(A, T,(I)) = sup(f xmin{val(Bi,I)\iE {l,...,n}}I 
A +a -B,& . . * &B, is a variable-free instance of a rule in P 
> 
. 
In the qualitative case the partial order of set inclusion among interpretations 
plays an important role. For the quantitative case we adopt Zadeh’s definition [lo] of 
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inclusion among fuzzy sets. For two interpretations I, c B,, Z2 c B, this gives 
Z,cZ, iff val(A,Z,)Ival(A,Z,) forall AEB~. 
Just as in the qualitative case, we define 
Z1=Z2 iff Z,CZ, and Z,cZ,. 
It follows immediately from Definition 2.5’ that Tp is a monotone function, for any 
rule set P. That is, Zi c Z, implies Tp(ZJ c Tp(Z,). It is well known that monotonic- 
ity implies that the least fixpoint lfp(T,) of Tp, namely 
n{z: T,(Z)=Z} 
exists and is equal to 
n{z:Tp(z)Lz}, 
and dually for greatest fixpoints (see for example [l], or [5]). 
A useful connection between models and fixpoints is established by Theorem 2.6, 
which was first stated and proved for the qualitative case in [3]. It makes just as 
much sense, and is just as true, in the quantitative case. 
Theorem 2.6, 2.6’. For every rule set P and for every Z 5 B,, P is true in Z # 
T,(Z) E I. 
PROOF. If: Z 2 T,,(Z) = val(A, I) 2 val(A, Tp(Z)) for any A E B,. Moreover, 
val(A, T,(Z)) 2f x min{val(B,,Z)(iE {l,...,n}} 
for any variable-free instance A + 0 -B,& . . . &B, of a rule in P, by Definition 
(2.5’). Hence 
val(A,Z)2fXmin{val(B,,Z)liE {l,...,n}}, 
and this implies that P is true in Z by Definition 2.1’. 
Only if: Let a rule set P and A E B, be given. P true in Z implies that for all 
variable-free instances A + @ -B,& . . . &B, of a rule in P we have 
val(A,Z)2fXmin{val(B,,Z)liE {Z,...,n}}. 
Hence 
val( A, Z) 2 sup(f X min{val(Bi,P)liEl,...,n}}I 
A -0 -B,& . . . dz B, is a variable-free instance of a rule in P 
> 
, 
and val( A, I) 2 val( A, Tp( I)) by Definition 2.5’. q 
Theorem 2.6 enables us to study fixpoints of Tp to discover properties of 
Herbrand models. It implies, for example, that flM( P) = lfp(T,), the least fixpoint 
of Tp. It follows that flM( P) is itself a Herbrand model, because the monotonicity 
of Tp implies that lfp(T,) = fl{ I: Tp( I) = Z } is itself a fixpoint of Tp. 
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Another important property is that 
lfp(T,)=U{T,(0)~n~N}, (2.7,2.7’) 
where N is the set of natural numbers. Again, this both makes sense and is true in 
the qualitative as well as in the quantitative case if, in the latter, we interpret 0 to 
mean the interpretation such that val(A, 0) = 0 for all A E B,. It is easy to prove 
(2.7) and (2.7’) from the continuity of Tp. 
Theorem 2.42.8’. Tp is continuous, i.e., 
U(T,(l,)lj+ =Tp(U{Z,lGNj) 
for all sequences ZlG Z, c - * . of Herbrand interpretations. 
PROOF. We prove the theorem for the quantitative case. Let A be an atomic 
formula: A E B,. Let UZ be U{ Z,lj E N }. According to the definition 2.5’ of T,, 
val( A, T(UZ)) = sup(f xmin{val(B,,UZ)IkE {l,...,n}}I 
A +a -B,& . . . &B, is a variable-free instance of a rule in P 
I 
. 
Let us use a to enumerate the variable-free instances of rules in P having A as 
conclusion. Thus 
A+Q-B,B~.-~LB,, a 
is the ath such variable-free instance. Then we can shorten the above expression to 
val(A,T(UZ))=sup,(f,Xmin,val(B,,,UZ)). 
Using val( Bnk, UZ) = supJval( Bak, , Z )), where j indexes the monotone sequence 
I, czzr ..a of Herbrand interpretations, we have 
vd( A, T(UZ)) = sup,supjfa X min,(val( Bak, I,)) 
= sup, sup, v, j ) 
where vaj = f, X mm,(val(B(,,, , Z )). 
Using the same notation we find 
vd( A,U( T( Zj)lj E N)) = SUPjSUPJJ,j. 
It remains to show that 
sup, supj 0, j = sup, sup,v, j. 
The set of all vuj is bounded above and therefore has a least upper bound, say, v. Of 
course, sup, supjv,, is an upper bound for the set of all vaj. Hence, 
sup, supj v, j 2 v . 
On the other hand, we have SUP,U,~ I u for all a. Hence sup,sup,~,~ I u. Thus we 
have found that sup,~up~v,~ = v. Similarly one shows that sup, SU~,V,~ = v, which 
completes the proof of the continuity of Tp. 0 
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An important task of this section on semantics is to establish a theorem that can 
serve as foundation for the completeness result in the next section on proof theory. 
A completeness result for a proof method is of the form: if an assertion is true, then 
it can be proved according to the method. In qualitative case we consider an 
assertion of the form A + , with A E B,, and we assume that it is true in all 
Herbrand models of the set P of rules. That is, we assume that A E flikf( P). We 
know that 
From the assumption that A is in the infinite union of the increasing sequence of 
sets 0 G Tp(0)C Ti(0)C -0. it follows immediately that there exists an NE N 
such that A E TpN( 0). T can be regarded as an operator adding one-step modus 
ponens consequences to its argument set. Hence, without going into any details of 
proof theory, it should be plausible that from the fact that A is in a finite power of T 
applied to 0, one can show that a finite proof of A exists according to a given proof 
method, not necessarily modus ponens. 
In the quantitative case we follow roughly the same path. Instead of assuming 
A E fM( P), we now assume val(A,flM(P) = (Y and we ultimately want to show 
that A + @ - can be derived from P. Theorem 2.8’ helps us prove that in the 
quantitative case also flM(P) = U{ T;( 0)ln E N}. But we would also like to draw 
the stronger conclusion from val( A, flM( P)) = (Y that there exists an N E N such 
that val(A, T/( 0)) = (Y. However, this seems to take more work than in the 
qualitative case. Here is one way of doing it. 
Lemma 2.10’. For any finite set of P of rules, any A E B,, and any real E > 0 
{vd(A, Tp”(0))ln EN and val(A,T,“(IZc))kc} 
is finite. 
PROOF. Let F be the set of factors of rules in P. Note that F is finite by our 
assumption about P. Let m be the greatest element of F such that m < 1. The real 
number val( A, Tt( 0 )) is a product of a sequence of elements of F. In this sequence, 
at most q elements can be less than 1, if q is the smallest integer such that rn9 < c. 
Because 1 can occur in the sequence any number of times, the sequence can have any 
length. Thus the number of different products 2 z of the sequences of elements of F 
is not greater than lF19. 0 
For the qualitative case, we have the following 
Theorem 2.11. For all sets P of rules, and all A E B,, A E fliV(P) implies that there 
exists an N E N such that A E TpN( 0). 
PROOF. fW( P) = lfp( Tp) = U{ T/!( 0)ln E N}. For A to be in this infinite union it is 
necessary that A E T;( 0) for an-n E N. •I 
Its quantitative analog is: 
Theorem 2.11’. For all finite sets P of rules, and all A E B,, there exists an N E N 
such that val( A, fl M( P )) = val( A, TpN( 0 )). 
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PROOF. If u = val(A,nM(P)) is zero, then the N obviously exists: N = 0 will do. 
Suppose now that u > 0. Then 
nhf(P) = lfp(T,) (by Theorem 2.6’) 




for any c smaller than u. If we choose such an e positive, which we can do by our 
assumption about u, then the latter set is finite by Lemma 2.10’. Hence the least 
upper bound is attained for an N E N. 0 
The following example shows that the condition of P being finite is not superflu- 
ous. Let 
p = { P(X) +a -4(x), P(X) +0444)) 
u(q(n)c@-Id=l-2-” and n=N). 
Consider 
val(p(s’(O)),T”(0)) =max{val(q(s’(O)),T”-‘(0)) (= l-2-‘), 
val( p(si+l(0)), Tn-l( 0))). 
For n 2 3, the contribution from the second rule is greater for all i. Hence 
val( p(s’(O), T”( 0)) = 1 - 22-i-n for i20, n20, i+nl3. 
When we keep i fixed and let n increase, this quantity does not attain its least upper 
bound. 
3. PROOF THEORY FOR QUANTITATIYE RULES 
Suppose we have the following rules: 
A +@-B&F, c+@-, 
A +-@-C&D, DC@, 
B+@-’ E+@-, 
F+-@-E. 
Suppose we want to prove that the truth value of A in the least model is at least 0.2. 
The first rule tells us to try and prove the same for B&F with truth value at least 
0.4, and hence that we must both prove B and F with truth value at least 0.4. We see 
that the best we can do for B is 0.2. We therefore do not even try to prove F, and 
conclude that the first rule for A gets us nowhere. The second rule then allows us to 
prove that the truth value of A in the least model is at least 0.225. 
In this section we need to describe precisely the proof procedure of which the 
above is an example, and we justify its result using the semantics of quantitative 
rule-based reasoning as presented in the previous section. 
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As in the qualitative case, the proof procedure in quantitative deduction is a 
search of an and/or tree. This tree, determined by a set P of rules and an initial 
atom G is defined as follows. 
There are two kinds of nodes: and-nodes and or-nodes. 
Each or-node is labeled by a single atomic formula. 
Each and-node is labeled by a rule from P and by a substitution. 
The descendants of every or-node are all and-nodes, and vice versa. 
The root is an or-node labeled by G. 
For every rule R in P with a left-hand side unifying with the atomic formula A 
(with most general unifier 6) in an or-node, there is an and-node descendant of 
the or-node labeled with R and 8. An or-node with no descendants i called a 
failure node. 
For every atomic formula B in the right-hand side of the rule labeling an 
and-node, there is a descendant or-node labeled with B. An and-node with no 
descendants i  called a success node. 
With each node of the and/or tree of a set P of rules we associate a real number. 
We call it the value of that node. The value of a success node is the factor of its 
associated rule. The value of a nonterminal and-node is fx m, where m is the 
minimum of the values of its descendants and f is the factor of the rule labeling the 
and-node. The value of a failure node is 0. The value of a nonterminal or-node is 
the maximum of the values of its descendants. 
A proof tree is a subtree of an and/or tree defined as follows. The root of the 
proof tree is the root of the and/or tree. An or-node of the proof tree which also 
occurs in the and/or tree has one descendant in the proof tree which is one of the 
descendants of that node in the and/or tree. An and-node in the proof tree which 
also occurs in the and/or tree has as descendants in the proof tree all of the 
descendants of that node in the and/or tree. Furthermore, all terminal nodes in a 
proof tree are success nodes. We assign values to proof-tree nodes in the same way 
as we do to nodes in an and/or tree. 
In the qualitative case, correctness of the (SLD-resolution) proof procedure says 
in its most elementary form: if A E B, is proved, then A E flM(P). We could 
express correctness like this: results of the proof procedure are not more true than 
they are in the minimal model flM( P). Formulated in this way, it immediately 
suggests the form of a corresponding correctness property in the quantitative case 
limited to finite and/or trees: 
Theorem 3.1’. For every set P of rules with a Jinite and/or tree and every A E B,, the 
value of the root in the and/or tree with A as root is not greater than val( A,nikf( P)). 
PROOF. Observe first that the value of the root in the and/or tree is the maximum of 
the values of the roots of its constituent proof trees. It can easily be verified that the 
value of the root of a proof tree with A as root is not greater than T;+‘( 0), where n 
is the length of a longest path from the root to a terminal node. Here one unit of 
path length is from or-node to or-node along the path. 0 
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The above theorem says that the result of an and/or tree is not too true, and this 
we argued to be analogous to correctness in the qualitative case. Similarly, complete- 
ness is the property of being true enough. 
Theorem 3.2’. For every set P of rules with aJinite and/or tree and every A E B,, the 
value v of the root in the and/or tree with A as root is at least val(A,flM( P)). 
PROOF. We prove by induction on n that v 2 val( A, T”( 0)) for all n E N. When we 
have shown that, we can conclude that 
u 2 sup{val(A, T”( 0))ln E N} 
=val(A,U{T”(0)1 nEN})=val(A,fW(P)). 
To start the inductive proof of v 2 val( A, T”( 0)), observe that it is true for n = 0. 
To prove the induction step, suppose that it holds for a certain value no of n. Then 
val( A, TnO+l (0))=sup(fxmin{val(B,,T”“(O))JkEN}I 
A +@)-B&.. * &B,, is a variable-free instance of a rule in P 
> 
. 
By Lemma 2.9’, the set over which the supremum is taken is finite. Therefore the 
supremum must be attained for a variable-free instance, say, 
A -0 -B,& . a. &B,, 
of a rule in P, say, R = A’ + @) -B’,& - * - C&B,‘. Thus we have 
val( A, T”o+l( 0)) = f Xmin{val(Bk,T”o(0))lkEN}. (3.3’) 
Let us now consider the and/or tree for P having A as root. One of the descendants 
of the root must be the rule R. Because its left-hand side A’ has A as variable-free 
instance, there is a most general unifier 8 of A and A’. Hence one of the descendants 
of the root is the node (R, 8) labeled with R and 8. Its descendants are Bid,. . . , B;t9 
with values vi,. . . , vi and having B,, . . . , B, respectively as variable-free instances. 
By the induction hypothesis, B,, _ . . , B, are roots of and/or trees having values 
Vl,..., vk such that vi 2 val(B,, T”o( la)), i = 1,. . . , k. Because B;O has B, as in- 
stance, we must have vi 2 vi. For the value v of the entire and/or tree, with A as 
root, we have v = f x min{ vjji = 1,. . . , k} and hence 
v~fXmin{val(Bi,T”o(0))li=l,...,k}. 
By (3.3’) we conclude that v 2 val( A, T “o+ ‘( 0 )), which completes the induction step 
of the proof. 0 
4. GAME-THEORETIC ASPECTS OF RULE-BASED REASONING 
Finally, after the tixpoint theory and the proof theory of quantitative deduction, we 
consider its game-theoretic aspects. We first review the main concepts of two-person 
games, because these have close parallels to rule-based reasoning (see, for example, 
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FIGURE 1. A game tree for the game of Nim. The sizes of the heaps are in parentheses. The 
color of the node indicates whose turn it is to move (White or Black). The single numbers 
indicate the value of the game at the node. The dotted outline indicates the forcing tree. 
[6,7]), both qualitative and quantitative. These parallels suggest an algorithm for a 
quantitative version of a PROLOG interpreter. 
There are two players, White and Black, and there is a state (for example the 
disposition of pieces on a board; or of matches over heaps, as in Nim). Starting from 
the initial state, players take turns making a move, that is, changing the state 
according to the rules of the game. If no move exists for the player whose turn it is 
to move, then that player has lost, the other has won, and the game is over. 
Optimal ways of playing a game can in theory be analyzed by means of the game 
tree. The nodes of a game tree are states, together with an indication of which 
player’s turn it is to move. The root node is the initial state, with White to move. The 
descendants in the game tree of a White-to-move node n are all states resulting from 
the moves by White starting in n. These descendants then have the indication that it 
is Black to move. 
Let us consider the game of Nim as an example. The state consists of a set of 
heaps of matches. A move consists of selecting a nonempty heap and removing at 
least one match from it. The game tree in Figure 1 has as root a state in which there 
are two heaps of matches, one with 2, one with 1 match. If a node is a white circle, 
then it is White’s turn to move. 
How does a game tree, in principle at least, allow one to determine an optimal 
move? In the terminal nodes the rules determine which player has won. If it is White, 
then attach a 1 as value to the node, otherwise a 0. A nonterminal node of which all 
descendants have a value obtains the maximum of the values of its descendants if it 
is a White-to-move node; otherwise the minimum. In this way the root in Figure 1 
obtains 1 as value, indicating that White can win against any play by Black (we say 
that it is a forced win for White). It can also be seen that there is just one initial 
move allowing White to win against any play by Black. 
How would White remember that sequence of moves to make in order to realize a 
forced win? Of course, it can consult the game tree. But not all of it is needed. Of 
White’s moves, all except one optimal move can be discarded, because White can 
choose its move. All of Black’s countermoves have to be kept, because White has no 
control over Black’s choice of move. What remains of the game tree is called the 
forcing tree. See Figure 1 for an example. 
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To discover a forcing tree one need not always traverse the entire game tree. 
Consider in Figure 1, for example, the node P. After noting that the move to P by 
Black causes White to lose, we need not traverse any sibling subtrees of P: we 
already know that the value of Q is 0 without visiting other descendants of Q (this is 
a so-called beta cutofl). Similar considerations, with the roles of White and Black 
reversed, allow us to skip other parts of the game tree. For example, one never has to 
look beyond the first forcing tree encountered (this is a so-called alpha cutofl). In 
Figure 1 this eliminates the rightmost subtree of the root. The process indicated here 
is called alpha-beta pruning. 
If the game tree is too large to traverse completely, then it may be possible to 
obtain approximate game values. Thus, let us consider a subtree of the game tree by 
removing all descendants of certain nodes. Then, in a terminal node in the subtree, 
the game may not have ended. Such a node receives as value a number between 0 
and 1, indicating the degree of expectation that its exact value is 1. In this way all 
terminal nodes receive values between 0 and 1 and all other nodes can be evaluated 
according to the max-min rule given above. 
To introduce the game-theoretic aspects of rule-based reasoning we first give an 
example of rules giving an and/or tree as close as possible to the game tree in Figure 
1. Let W(x, y) mean that White can win starting in a state of two heaps, with x 
matches on the one heap and y matches on the other heap. The rules of Nim then 
state that 
w&2) +@W(O,O). 
The and/or tree for these rules and the root W(1,2) is shown in Figure 2. We have 
omitted rules saying that White can win from (0,l) and from (l,O). It may not be 
possible to do this in a way yielding an and/or tree isomorphic to the game tree in 
Figure 1. 
I.\ .,‘.I 
K--- W( 1 .a 4s W(O,O)&W(O, 1)A A w(1,2~ew(o,o) W( 1.2) e wto, 1 J&W 1 ,O) 
W(0.0) wco, 1) W(O,l) W( 1 ,O) W(O.0) 
. . . . . 
. . . . . 
. . . . . 
FIGURE 2. And/or tree corresponding to the upper part of the game tree in Figure 1. 
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It is not necessary for game trees to be exactly translatable to and/or trees for 
our purpose. What matters is that: 
Or-nodes correspond to White-to-move nodes, and-nodes to Black-to-move nodes. 
If all factors are 1 in quantitative rules with nonempty right-hand sides, then the 
values of nodes in an and/or tree are formed according to the same rules as in 
a game tree with heuristic approximations to true game values. 
The proof tree in an and/or tree is the analog of the forcing tree in the game tree. 
When searching for a proof tree, in an and/or tree alpha-beta pruning is 
applicable in the same way as when searching for a forcing tree in a game tree. 
In the and/or tree an obvious modification takes care of the case when there 
are factors different from 1. 
The last point is for us the main justification of comparing rule-based reasoning to 
two-person games: the well-known algorithm for alpha-beta pruning (see Winston 
[9] for a Lisp version, van Emden and Clark [4] for a logic program) can be used to 
interpret quantitative rules in principle with the same efficiency as a PROLOG 
machine interprets qualitative rules. The only change required is to multiply the 
truth value by a suitable factor. 
If an and/or tree is like a game tree, then what is the game behind the and/or 
tree? This must be a game with or-nodes as states in which White moves, and with 
and-nodes as states in which Black moves. White’s move consists of selecting a rule 
matching the or-node in which it is to move. Black’s move consists of selecting an 
atom from the condition in the rule labeling the and-node in which it is to move. In 
the qualitative case, White wins when Black is to move in a state having a rule with 
no condition. Black wins when White is to move in a state having an atom matching 
no rule. Note that neither a win by White nor a win by Black in itself implies the 
existence or otherwise of a proof. But if, in this game, White can win against any 
play by Black, then and only then a proof exists. This is implied by the correspon- 
dence, noted above, between proof trees and forcing trees. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Rule sets in expert systems are typically not recursive. Yet, conceptually at least, our 
restriction to finite and/or trees is disappointing. We would like to have as few 
differences as possible between expert systems and logic programs, where infinite 
and/or trees are common. 
We have required our and/or trees to be finite because, in general, the min-max 
algorithm only works for finite trees. There are at least two exceptions. The first is 
the special case where truth values are only 0 and 1, that is, the qualitative case. If, in 
this case, an infinite and/or tree is scanned from left to right and there is a success 
node to the left of the leftmost infinite branch, then this branch is cut off by 
alpha-beta pruning. As a result, the value of the root is determined by a terminating 
algorithm. This describes the behavior of a PROLOG interpreter instructed to find 
one solution only. 
Let us now consider another special case where we can handle infinite and/or 
trees. This is the case where all factors of rules are less than 1. Here it is important 
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that the search algorithm for and/or trees is not quite the same as alpha-beta search 
of game trees. There is one difference, conceptually trivial and easy to implement, 
which has interesting consequences. This is that in a game tree, black-to-move nodes 
receive as game value the minimum of the values of their descendants. The 
corresponding and-nodes receive as value the minimum multiplied by the factor of 
the rule associated with the and-node. When searching the tree from the top down, 
each or-node has associated with it a certain threshold. The subtree below this node 
has to deliver a value at least as large as this threshold to be worth exploring. The 
threshold of the next or-node down the tree will be t/j, where j is the factor of the 
intervening rule. Thus, if all factors are less than 1 and if there are only finitely many 
rules, then infinite branches, the bane of PROLOG execution, are avoided: as one 
goes down the tree, thresholds must ultimately increase beyond 1, at which point the 
branch can be safely abandoned. 
What is the role of “negation by failure” in quantitative deduction? Proof-theo- 
retically, the phenomenon certainly occurs: if the initial goal is a variable-free atomic 
formula A with threshold greater than val(A,flM(P)) and if the and/or tree is 
favorable (by being finite or because the rules have suitable factors), then search will 
terminate without a proof tree being found. 
Negation by failure usually means a semantical characterization of this phenome- 
non. K. L. Clark [2] has shown for logic programs that the negation of a goal giving 
rise to finite failure is a logical implication of a strengthened version of the logic 
program. Note that logical implication means truth in all models, not just Herbrand 
models. In our treatment we only consider Herbrand models. This restriction seems 
to be essential: our models have to be sets so that we can make the transition to the 
quantitative case by changing these sets to be fuzzy. As we have warned our readers, 
the turnstile symbol (!= ) is used in a nonstandard way: it means truth in all 
Herbrand models rather than in all models. Because of our restriction to Herbrand 
models we cannot contemplate a semantical characterisation of negation by failure 
in the sense of Clark. 
Other characterizations of negation by failure are possible. For example, [l] 
proves that atoms giving rise to finite failed and/or trees are contained in the 
complement of the greatest fixpoint of the mapping Tp associated with the rule set 
P. (Lloyd [5] is a convenient source for this result as well as for negation by failure.) 
It is plausible that a similar result can be proved for the quantitative case. 
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